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Abstract
Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting
structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which
is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal of the organization as a whole is to maximize the
net productive output. Individuals in these networks trade off between their productive and
managing efforts to perform these tasks and the trade-off is influenced by their positions and
share of rewards in the network. Efforts of the agents here are substitutable, e.g., the increase
in the productive effort by an individual in effect reduces the same of some other individual in
the network, who now puts their efforts into management. The management effort of an agent
improves the productivity of certain other agents in the network.
In this paper, we carry out a detailed game-theoretic analysis of individual’s equilibrium split
of efforts into multiple components when connected over a network. We provide a design recipe
of the reward sharing scheme that maximizes the net productive output. Our results show that
under the strategic behavior of the agents, it may not always be possible to achieve the optimal
output using an idea from game theory called the price of anarchy.
Keywords: Organizational networks; Network graphs; Game theory; Production efforts; Manage-
ment efforts; Nash equilibrium; Price of anarchy.
1 Introduction
The organization of economic activity as a means for the efficient co-ordination of effort is a cor-
nerstone of economic theory. In networked organizations, agents are responsible for two processes:
information flow and productive effort. A major objective of the organization is to maximize the
net productive output of the networked system. However, in real organizations the individuals are
responsible for multiple job roles and are rational and intelligent. They select their degree of effort
which maximizes their payoff. Hence, to understand how organizations can boost their productive
output, we need to understand how the individuals connected over a network split their efforts be-
tween these different roles. In particular, we study how agents in a specific model split their efforts
∗A preliminary version of this work has appeared as an abstract in the conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), 2014. The authors would like to thank Y. Narahari, David C. Parkes, Arunava Sen,
and Panos Toulis for useful discussions. This work is supported by a Tata Consultancy Services doctoral fellowship.
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between ‘effort to perform the task’ versus ‘investing effort in explaining tasks to others’ depending
on the amount of direct and indirect rewards. We model the agents having dual responsibilities of
executing the task (production effort) and communicating the information (communication effort)
to other agents. When an agent communicates with another, we call the former an influencer
and the latter an influencee. Influencers improve the productivity of the influencees. Influencees,
in turn, share a part of their rewards with the influencers, and this induces a game between the
agents connected over the network. In our model, working on a task brings a direct payoff but is
more costly, whereas investing effort in explaining a task can improve the productivity of others
(depending on the quality of communication in the network) and is less costly. The latter in turn
generate additional indirect reward for an agent through reward sharing incentives.
We model the network as a directed graph, where the direction represents the direction of infor-
mation flow or communication between nodes and the rewards are shared in the reverse direction.
Of particular interest to us are directed trees, which represent a hierarchy, and are most prevalent
in the structure of organizations and firms. In the first part of the paper, our analysis is focused
on hierarchies, and in the second, we generalize our results to arbitrary directed graphs.
The focus of this paper is to maximize the productive output of the organization, and in the
process, understand the strategic behavioral dynamics of the influencing phenomenon and find
the equilibrium efforts chosen by the human participants in an organizational network. Within
firms, organizational networks are often hierarchical and there is a long history on the role of
organizational structure on economic efficiency going back to the work of Tichy et al. (1979) on
social network analysis within organizations. More recently, Radner (1992); Ravasz and Baraba´si
(2003); Mookherjee (2010) study the role of hierarchies; see Van Alstyne (1997) for a survey of
different perspectives. On the critical side, the work of Cronin et al. (2015) shows the adverse
effects of hierarchy in human cooperation.
There is also a growing interest in crowdsourcing. Most relevant here, is the ability to gen-
erate effective networks for solving challenging problems. Our model also captures some aspects
of ‘diffusion-based task environments’ where agents become aware of tasks through recruitment
(Pickard et al., 2011; Watts and Peretti, 2007). For example, the winner of the 2009 DARPA Red
Balloon Challenge adopted an indirect reward scheme where the reward associated with successful
completion of subtasks was shared with other agents in the network (Pickard et al., 2011). At the
same time modern massive online social networks and online gaming networks1 require information
and incentive propagation to organize activity. In this paper, we draw attention to the interac-
tion between various aspects of network influence, such as profit sharing (Gerhart et al., 1995),
information exchange (Bhatt, 2001), and influence in networks.
Motivated by the perspective that this phenomenon of splitting effort into production and
communication can be understood as a consequence of the strategic behavior of the participants,
we adopt a game theoretic model where individual members in a networked organization decide
on effort levels motivated by their self interest. Agents are coordinated by incentives, including
both direct wages and indirect profit sharing. We construct quantitative models of organizations,
that are general enough to capture social and economic networks, but specific enough for us to
obtain insightful results. We quantify the effects of reward sharing and communication quality on
the performance of work organizations in equilibrium. We then turn to the question of designing
proper reward shares that can motivate people to maximize the social output of the system. We
show that for stylized networks, under certain conditions, a proper incentive design can lead to the
1http://www.eveonline.com/
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optimal social output. But when the condition is not satisfied, we capture the loss in optimality
using the Price of Anarchy (PoA) framework. In particular, we provide the worst case bound on
the sub-optimality.
1.1 Overview of the Main Results
For an easier exposition, in the first and major part of this work, we study hierarchies where the
network is a directed tree. Each agent decides how to split its effort between (i) production effort,
which results in direct payoff for the agent and indirect reward to other agents on the path from
the root to the agent, and (ii) communication effort, which serves to improve the productivity
of his descendants on the tree (e.g., explaining the problem to others, conveying insights and
the goals of the organization). A natural constraint is imposed on the complementary tasks of
production and communication, such that the more effort an agent invests in production the less he
can communicate. Investing production effort incurs a cost to an agent, in return for some direct
payoff. But committing effort to communication the can improve productivity of descendants,
which in turn improves their output, should they decide to invest effort in direct work, and thus
give an agent a return on investment through an indirect payoff.
Each agent decides, based on his position in the hierarchy, how to split his effort between
production and communication, in order to maximize the sum of direct payoff and indirect reward,
accounting for the cost of effort. For most of our results we adopt an exponential productivity
(EP) model, where the quality of communication falls exponentially with effort spent in production
with a parameter β. The model has the useful property that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
always exists (Theorem 1) even though the game is non-concave. In a concave game, the agents’
payoffs are concave in their choices (production efforts), and a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is
guaranteed to exist (Rosen, 1965). The equilibrium effort given by our result explains how a ‘better
communication’ and ‘increase in the cost of management’ incentivizes an agent to devote more effort
in production – and also how it is beneficial to spend more effort in management when the ‘reward
sharing’ increases. We develop tight conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium (Theorem 2).
In addition, for the EP model of communication, the Nash equilibrium can be computed in time that
is quadratic in the number of agents, despite the non-concave nature of the problem, by exploiting
the hierarchical structure.
We then ask the question what effect this equilibrium effort level has on the total output of
the hierarchical organization. We define the social output to be the sum of the individual outputs
which are products of productivity and production effort. Our next result is that for balanced
hierarchies and in the EP model, there exists a threshold β∗ on communication quality parameter
β such that if the parameter is below the threshold (communication is ‘good enough’) then the
equilibrium social output can be made equal to the optimal social output by choosing the optimal
reward sharing scheme. The phenomenon is captured by the fraction called price of anarchy (PoA),
which is the ratio of the optimal and the equilibrium social output. If the reward share is not
chosen appropriately, PoA can be large (Example 1). For β above this threshold (‘low quality’
communication), we give closed-form bounds on the PoA (Theorem 4), which we show are tight
in special networks, e.g., single-level hierarchies. This highlights the importance of the design of
reward sharing in organizations accounting for both network structure and communication process
in order to achieve a higher network output.
In the second part, we consider general directed network graphs and establish the existence
of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and a characterization for when this equilibrium is unique
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(Theorems 5 and 6). We provide a geometric interpretation of these conditions in terms of the
stability properties of a suitably defined Jacobian matrix (Figure 6). This connection between
control-theoretic stability and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in network games is an interesting
property of our model.
For ease of reading, some proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
2 A Hierarchical Model of Influencer and Influencee
1
2 3
...
θ
root
origin
Figure 1: A typical hierarchical network
model.
In this section, we formalize a specific version of the hi-
erarchical network model. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote
a set of agents who are connected over a hierarchy T .
Each node i has a set of influencers, whose communica-
tion efforts influence his own direct payoff, and a set of
influencees, whose direct payoffs are influenced by node i.
In turn, the production efforts of these influencees endow
agent i with indirect payoffs. The origin (denoted by node
θ) is a node assumed to be outside the network, and com-
municates perfectly with the first (root) node, denoted by
1.
We number nodes sequentially, so that each child has
a higher index than his parent, thus the adjacency matrix
is an upper triangular matrix with zeros on the diagonal.
Figure 1 illustrates the model for an example hierarchical
network.
The set of influencers of node i consists of the nodes
(excluding node i) on the unique path from the origin to the node, and is denoted by Pθ→i. The
set of influencees of node i consists of the nodes (again, excluding node i) in the subtree Ti below
her.
The production effort, denoted by xi ∈ [0, 1], of node i yields a direct payoff to the node, and
the particular way in which this occurs depends on its productivity. The remaining effort, 1 − xi,
goes to communication effort, and improves the productivity of the influencees of the node. The
constant sum of production effort and communication effort models the constraint on an agent’s
time, and therefore it is enough to write both the direct and indirect payoff of a node as a function
of the production effort xi. In particular, the productivity of a node, denoted by pi(xPθ→i), depends
on the communication effort (and thus the production effort) of the influencers on path Pθ→i to
the node. The production effort profile of these influences is denoted by xPθ→i .
It is useful to associate xipi(xPθ→i) with the value from the direct output of node i. The payoff
to node i comprises two additive terms that capture:
(1) the direct payoff, which depends on the value generated by the direct output of a node and
the cost of production and communication effort, and is modulated by the productivity of the node,
and
(2) the indirect payoff, which is a fraction of the value associated with the direct output of any
influencee j of the node.
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Taken together, the payoff to a single node i is:
ui(xi, x−i) = pi(xPθ→i)f(xi) +
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
hijpj(xPθ→j )xj . (1)
The first term is the product of the direct payoff and a function f(xi) (which models production
output and cost) and captures the trade-off between direct output and cost of production and
communication effort. The second term is the total indirect payoff received by node i due to
the output pj(xPθ→j )xj of its influencees. We insist that the productivity pj(·) of any node j
is non-decreasing in the communication effort of each influencer, and thus non-increasing in the
production effort of each influencer, and hence we require ∂∂xi pj(xPθ→j ) 6 0 for all nodes j, where
i is an influencer of j.
Each node i receives a share hij of the value of the direct output of influencee j. The model
can also capture a setting where an agent can only share output he creates, i.e. the total fraction
of the output an agent retains and shares with the influencers is bounded at 1. Let us assume that
agent j retains a share sjj and shares sij with influencers i ∈ Pθ→j . A budget-balance constraint
on the amount of direct value that can be shared requires
∑
i∈Pθ→j∪{j} sij 6 1. Assume that
sjj = γ > 0, for all j, so that each node retains the same fraction γ of its direct output value.
Then, the earlier inequality can be written as,
∑
i∈Pθ→j
sij
γ 6
1
γ − 1. Define hij :=
sij
γ . In addition
to notational cleanliness, this transformation gives the advantage of not having any upper bound
on the
∑
i∈Pθ→j hij , since any finite sum can always be accommodated with a proper choice of γ.
Let us call the matrix H = [hij ] containing all the reward shares as the reward sharing scheme.
To highlight our results, we focus on a specific form of the payoff model, namely the Exponential
Productivity (EP) model. A model is an instantiation of the direct-payoff function f(xi) and the
productivity function pi(·). In particular, in the EP model:2
f(xi) = xi − x
2
i
2
− b(1− xi)
2
2
, (2)
pi(xPθ→i) =
∏
k∈Pθ→i
µ(Ck)e
−βxk , (3)
where b > 0 is the cost of communication, Ck is the number of children of node k, function
µ(Ck) ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to be non-increasing, and β > 0 denotes the noise in the communication,
with higher β corresponding to a lower quality of communication. We assume p1 = 1 for the root
node. This models the root having perfect productivity. We interpret the term µ(Ck)e
−βxk as the
communication influence of node k on the agents in his subtree, and this takes values in [0, 1].
The direct payoff of an agent i is quadratic in production effort xi, and reflects a linear benefit
xi from direct production effort but a quadratic cost x
2
i /2 for effort. The utility model given by
Equation (1) resembles the utility model given by Ballester et al. (2006). However, there are a few
subtle differences in our model than that in this paper: (a) the utility of agent i is not concave in
her production effort xi (caused by the exponential term in the productivity); thus the existence
of a pure Nash equilibrium is nontrivial (for concave games pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed
to exist (Rosen, 1965)), (b) each agent has two types of effort, namely production and communi-
cation, and the communication effort of an agent is complementary to the production efforts of her
2Similar conclusions can be drawn for a reasonable choice of a concave f and non-decreasing pi’s. However, we
pick these reasonable forms for analytical convenience and to obtain closed form expressions that enable us make
clear observations and conclusions.
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influencees, while the production efforts are substitutable to each other. Also, the complementarity
is nonlinear. In Section 4, we address quite general nonlinear complementarity. This is a step
forward to the multidimensional effort distribution with nonlinear correlation between the efforts
among agents. We chose this particular form to capture a realistic organizational hierarchy. (c) In
addition, we also consider the cost due to communication, captured by b(1− xi)2/2.
The productivity of node j, given by pj(xPθ→j ), where j ∈ Ti \{i} warrants careful observation.
Here we explain the components of this function and the reasons for choosing them. Consider
µ(Ck), which is non-increasing in the number of children. The set Ck captures the idea that the
effect of the communication effort is reduced if the node has more children to communicate with.
An increase in production effort xk reduces the productivity of influencees of node k. In particular,
the exponential term in the productivity captures two effects: (a) a linear decrease in production
effort gives exponential gain in the productivity of influencee, which captures the importance of
communication and management in organizations (Allen and Hall, 2007). Smaller values of β model
better communication and a stronger positive effect on an influencee. (b) We can approximate other
models by choosing β appropriately. Linear productivity corresponds to small values of β. This
property is useful when the effects of production and communication on the payoff are equally
important. For large β there is very small communication quality between agents and the value of
communication effort is low.
The successive product of these exponential terms in the path from root to a node reflects the
fact that a change in the production effort of an agent affects the productivity of the entire subtree
below her. We note that the productivity of node j, where j ∈ Ti \ {i}, is not a concave function
of xi, leading to the payoff function ui to be non-concave in xi. Hence the existence of a Nash
equilibrium is not guaranteed a priori through known results on concave games (Rosen, 1965). In
the next section we will demonstrate the required conditions on existence and uniqueness of a Nash
equilibrium. For brevity of notation, we will drop the arguments of productivity pi at certain places
where it is clear from the context.
Our results on existence, uniqueness and their interpretations generalize to other network struc-
tures beyond hierarchies, which we show in the later part of the paper. However, despite the math-
ematical simplicity of the EP model, it allows for obtaining interesting results on the importance of
influence, both communication and incentives, and gives insight on outcome efforts in a networked
organization.
2.1 Main Results
The effect of communication efforts between nodes i and j, where i ∈ Pθ→j is captured by the
fractional productivity
pj
pi
defined as, pij(xPi−→j ) =
∏
k∈Pi−→j µ(Ck)e
−βxk , (the node i− is the
parent of i in the hierarchy). This term is dependent only on the production efforts in the path
segment between i and j and accounts for ‘local’ effects. We show in the following theorem that
the Nash equilibrium production effort of node i depends on this local information from all its
descendants.
Theorem 1 (Existence of Pure Nash Equilibrium) A pure Nash equilibrium always exists in
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the effort game in the EP model, and is given by the production effort profile (x∗i , x
∗
−i) that satisfies,
3
x∗i =
1− β
1 + b
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
hijpij(x
∗
Pi−→j
)x∗j
+ . (4)
The proof of this theorem uses the hierarchical structure of the network and the fact that the
productivity functions (pi’s) are bounded. We present the proof in Appendix A.
This theorem shows that the EP model allows us to guarantee the existence of (at least one)
Nash equilibrium. In particular, we can make certain observations on the equilibrium production
effort, some of which are intuitive.
• If communication improves, i.e., β becomes small, the production effort of each node increases.
• If the cost of management b increases, the production effort of each node increases.
• When reward sharing (hij) is large, agents reduce production effort and focus more on com-
munication effort, which is more productive in terms of payoffs.
• The computation of a Nash equilibrium at any node depends only on the production efforts of
the nodes in its subtree. Thus, we can employ a backward induction algorithm which exploits
this property that helps in an efficient computation of the equilibrium (this will be shown
formally in the corollaries later in this section).
We now turn to establishing conditions for the uniqueness of this Nash equilibrium. Let us define
the maximum amount of reward share that any node i can accumulate from a hierarchy T given
a reward sharing scheme H as, hmax(T ) = supi
∑
j∈Ti\{i} hij . We also define the effort update
function as follows.
Definition 1 (Effort Update Function (EUF)) Let the function F : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n be de-
fined as,
Fi(x) =
1− β
1 + b
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
hijpij(xPi−→j )xj
+ .
Note that the RHS of the above expression contains the production efforts of all the agents in the
subtree of agent i. This function is a prescription of the choice of the production effort of agent i,
given a certain effort profile of the agents below i in the hierarchy (Theorem 1). Hence the name
‘effort update’.
Theorem 2 (Sufficiency for Uniqueness) If β <
√
1+b
hmax(T )
, the Nash equilibrium effort profile
(x∗i , x
∗
−i) is unique and is given by Equation (4).
The proof of this theorem shows that F is a contraction, and is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 3 (Tightness) The sufficient condition of Theorem 2 is tight.
3Define x+ := max{0, x}.
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Proof : Consider a three-node hierarchy with nodes 2 and 3 being the children of node 1 (Figure 2).
We show that if the sufficient condition is just violated, it results in multiple equilibria. Let b = 0,
and h12 = h13 = 0.25, therefore hmax(T ) = 0.25. Theorem 2 requires that β < 1/
√
0.25 = 2. We
choose β = 2. The equilibrium efforts for node 2 and 3 are 1. Node 1 solves the following equation
to find the equilibria.
1− x1 = e−2x1 .
This equation has multiple solutions, x1 = 0, 0.797, showing non-uniqueness. 
2 3
1
θ
Figure 2: Tightness of the suf-
ficiency (Theorem 2).
The uniqueness condition indicates that the communication
quality needs to be ‘good enough’ (small β) to ensure uniqueness
of an equilibrium. It is worth noting that the uniqueness condition
ensures the convergence of the best response dynamics, in which
all the players start from any arbitrary effort profile xinit, and se-
quentially update their efforts via the function F , to the unique
equilibrium. This is a consequence of the fact that F is a contrac-
tion.
We now turn to the computational complexity of a Nash equi-
librium. If there are multiple NE, these complexity results hold for
computing a NE. Recall that the equilibrium computation of an
agent requires only the production efforts and the reward structure
of its subtree, and we can take advantage of the backward induction. This observation leads to the
following corollary.
Corollary 1 The worst-case complexity of computing the equilibrium effort of node i is O(|Ti|2).
As a result, in this hierarchical model, the worst-case complexity of computing the equilibrium efforts
of the whole network is O(n2).
Using the structure of the Nash equilibrium obtained in this section, we now address the question
of the total productive output generated in equilibrium.
3 Maximizing the Productive Output of the Network
In our model, the equilibrium behavior of the agents are tightly coupled with the network structure
and the reward sharing scheme as seen from Equation (4). In this section, we look at how the
equilibrium behavior affects the social output of the hierarchy T for a given effort vector x ∈ [0, 1]n,
defined as follows.
SO(x, T ) =
∑
i∈N
pi(xPθ→i)xi (5)
This quantity captures the sum of the output of each individual agents in the network, where
the output of each agent is the product of their productivity and production effort. For a given
hierarchy T , define the optimal effort vector as xOPT ∈ argmaxx SO(x, T ). This is the production
effort profile across the network that maximizes the total direct output value, considering also the
effect of communication effort (induced by lower production effort) on the productivity of other
nodes. Ideally a planner (the management of an organization) would like to achieve this maximal
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social output for the given hierarchy. However, the strategic choice of the individuals might not
always lead to this global performance. The question we address in this section is how the Nash
equilibrium effort level x∗ performs in comparison to the socially optimal outcome xOPT.
Note that computing xOPT is easy for the EP model. Finding the maxima of SO(x, T ) can be
done via backward induction on the levels in the hierarchy and solving nonlinear equations of single
variable at each stage.
We will consider cases where the equilibrium is unique, hence, the price of anarchy (Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou, 1999) is given by:
PoA =
SO(xOPT, T )
SO(x∗, T )
. (6)
This quantity measures the degree of efficiency of the network. Making PoA equal to unity
would be the ideal achievement for the designer. However, that may not always be possible given
the parameters of the model. In such a case, we provide a design procedure of the reward sharing
scheme that yields the maximum social output.
We note that the equilibrium effort profile x∗ depends on the reward sharing scheme H, while
xOPT does not. The goal of this section is to understand how one can engineer the H to reduce the
PoA (thereby making the social output closer to the optimal). The following example shows that
if the reward sharing is not properly designed, the PoA can be arbitrarily large. We first consider
a single-level hierarchy (see Figure 3). To simplify the analysis, we also assume that the function
µ(C1) = 1, irrespective of the number of children of node 1. By symmetry, we consider a single
value h, such that h12 = h13 = . . . = h1n = h. We refer to this model as FLAT. We will return to
this model later as well, after presenting our results for more general balanced hierarchies. We first
consider what happens when there is bad communication (β large) and no profit sharing (h = 0),
between node 1 and its children.
Example 1 (Large PoA) For n > 3, the PoA is n−12 in the FLAT hierarchy when β = ln(n− 1)
and h = 0. For FLAT, the social output is given by, SO(x, FLAT) =
∑n
i=2 e
−βx1xi + x1. We see
that β = ln(n− 1) > − ln
(
1− 1n−1
)
, for all n > 3. The optimal effort profile xOPT = (0, 1, . . . , 1)
maximizes the social output (stated in Corollary 2, for a proof see Lemma 6 in Appendix B). Hence
the optimal social output is n−1. However, for reward sharing factor h = 0, we get the equilibrium
effort profile from Equation (4) to be x∗ = (1, 1, . . . , 1). This yields a social output of (n−1)e−β+1.
Hence the PoA is n−1
(n−1)e− ln(n−1)+1 =
n−1
2 .
However, if h is chosen appropriately, e.g., if it were chosen to be large positive, the equilibrium
effort profile would have been closer to that of the optimal – leading to PoA being closer to 1.
This raises a natural question: is it always possible to design a suitable reward sharing scheme
that can make PoA = 1 for any given hierarchy? In order to answer that, we define the stability of
an effort profile x.
Definition 2 (Stable Effort Vector) An effort profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) is stable, represented
by x ∈ S, if x > 0, and there exists a reward sharing matrix H = [hij ], hij > 0, such that,∑
j∈Ti\{i}
aij(x)hij > 1− xi;
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
hij 6
1 + b
β2
, ∀i ∈ N. (7)
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Where, aij(x) =
β
1+bpij(xPi−→j )xj, for all j ∈ Ti \ {i}, and zero otherwise. If such a solution H∗
exists, we call it a stable reward sharing matrix.
1
. . .2 n
θ
Figure 3: FLAT hierarchy.
The inequalities capture a required balance between incentives
and information flow. In the first inequality, for a fixed communi-
cation factor β and cost coefficient b, the term aij(·) is proportional
to the fractional output (fractional productivity × production ef-
fort) of an agent j. After multiplying with hij , this is the effective
indirect output that i receives from j. The RHS of the inequality
can be interpreted as the communication effort of agent i. Hence,
this inequality says that the total indirect benefit should be at least
equal to the effort put in by a node for communicating the informa-
tion to its subtree. If we consider that the agents share information
based on the reward share they receive, the flow of information and
reward forms a closed loop. The second inequality says that the closed loop ‘gain’ of the informa-
tion flow (β2) and the reward share accumulated by agent i (
∑
j∈Ti\{i} hij) should be bounded by
the cost of sharing the information. The closed loop ‘gain’ is essentially the reward that an agent
accumulates due to his communication effort through his descendants. We can connect a stable
effort vector with the Nash equilibrium of the effort game.
Lemma 1 (Stability-Nash Relationship) If an effort profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) is stable, it is the
unique Nash equilibrium of the effort game with the corresponding stable reward sharing matrix.
Proof : Let x is a stable effort profile. So, there exists a stable reward sharing matrix corresponding
to it. Let H = [hij ], hij > 0 be the matrix, s.t. the inequalities corresponding to Equation (7) are
satisfied with x. Since x > 0, reorganizing the first inequality of Equation (7) and noting the fact
that xi > 0, ∀i ∈ N , we get,
xi =
1− ∑
j∈Ti\{i}
aij(x)hij
+ , ∀i ∈ N.
Under the condition given by the second inequality of Equation (7), the Nash equilibrium is unique
and is given by the above expression (recall Theorem 2). Hence, x is the unique Nash equilibrium
of this game. 
Now it is straightforward to see that the stability of xOPT is sufficient for PoA to be 1. This is
because now the H that makes the xOPT vector stable can be used as the reward sharing scheme,
and for that H the equilibrium effort profile will coincide with xOPT. In other words, the optimal
effort vector can be supported in equilibrium by a suitable reward sharing scheme. Hence, the
following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 2 (No Anarchy) A stable reward sharing scheme corresponding to xOPT yields a PoA of
1.
A couple of important questions are then: how efficiently can we check if a given effort profile
x is stable or not? And how to choose a reward sharing scheme that makes the effort profile stable?
10
The answer is that we can solve the following feasibility linear program (LP) for a given effort
profile:
min 1
s.t.
∑
j∈Ti\{i} aij(x)hij > 1− xi,∑
j∈Ti\{i} hij 6
1+b
β2
,
hij > 0,∀j,
 ∀i ∈ N. (8)
If a solution exists to the above LP, we conclude that x is stable and declare the corresponding H
to be the resulting reward sharing scheme. Linear programs can be efficiently solved and therefore
checking an effort profile for stability can be done efficiently.
A Note on the Reward Share Design This condition gives us a recipe of the design of the
reward sharing scheme. However, the next question is: what happens when the xOPT is unstable? If
the above feasibility LP does not return any solution matrix H, we conclude that xOPT /∈ S, where
S is the set of all stable effort vectors. In such a scenario, we cannot guarantee PoA to be unity.
However, for any given reward sharing matrix H, there is an equilibrium effort profile x∗(H). We
can, therefore, solve for Hmax ∈ argmaxH:x∗(H)∈S SO(x∗(H)) which leads to an equilibrium effort
profile x∗(Hmax) that lies in the stable set and maximize the social output. Therefore, when we
cannot find a reward sharing scheme to achieve the optimal social output, Hmax is our best bet.
Computing Hmax for general hierarchies may be a hard problem, and we leave that as an interesting
future work. However, for certain special classes of hierarchies, it is possible to derive bounds on
the PoA (thereby providing a design recipe for H to achieve a lower bound on the social output). In
the following section, we do the same for the balanced hierarchies. The price of anarchy analysis,
therefore, serves as a means to find the optimal reward sharing scheme that gives a theoretical
guarantee on the social output of the system.
3.1 Price of Anarchy in Balanced Hierarchies
In this section we consider a simple yet representative class of hierarchies, namely the balanced
hierarchies, and analyze the effect of communication on PoA and provide efficient bounds. Hier-
archies in organizations are often (nearly) balanced, and the FLAT or linear networks are special
cases of the balanced hierarchy (depth = 1 or degree = 1). Hence, the class of balanced hierarchies
can generate useful insights. In addition, the symmetry in balanced hierarchies allows us to obtain
interpretable closed-form bounds and understand the relative importance of different parameters.
We consider a balanced d-ary tree of depth D. By symmetry, the efforts of the nodes that are at
the same level of the hierarchy are same at both equilibrium and optimality. This happens because
of the fact that in the EP model, both the equilibrium and optimal effort profile computation
follows a backward induction method starting from the leaves towards the root. Since the nodes in
the same level of the hierarchy is symmetric in the backward induction steps, they have identical
effort profiles.
With a little abuse of notation, we denote the efforts of each node at level i by xi. We start
numbering the levels from root, hence, there are D+ 1 levels. Note that there are a few interesting
special cases of this model, namely (a) d = 2: balanced binary tree, (b) D = 1: flat hierarchy,
(c) d = 1: line. We assume, for notational simplicity only, that the function µ(Ck) = 1, for all
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Ck, though our results generalize. This function is the coefficient of the productivity function.
µ(Ck) = 1 also models organizations where each manager is assigned a small team and there is no
attenuation in productivity due to the number of children. In order to present the price of anarchy
(PoA) results, we define the set ξ:
ξ(β) =
{
x : x =
[
1− 1
β
e−βx
]+}
. (9)
This set is the set of possible equilibrium effort levels for agents at the penultimate level of the
EP model hierarchy when β > 1. Note that this set is a singleton, when β > 1. Depending on β,
we define a lower bound φ(d, β) on the contribution of an agent toward the social output, and a
sequence of nested functions ti, where d is the degree of each node.
φ(d, β) = max
{
1
β
(1 + ln(dβ)), dβ + (1− dβ)ξ(β)
}
,
t1(d, β) = φ(d, β), t2(d, β) = φ(d · φ(d, β), β), . . . , tD(d, β) = φ(d · tD−1(d, β), β).
(10)
Theorem 4 (Price of Anarchy) For a balanced d-ary hierarchy with depth D, as β increases,
we can show the following price of anarchy results.
When 0 6 β 6 1, PoA = 1,
and when 1 < β <∞, PoA 6 d
D
tD(d, β)
.
(11)
Proof : The proof is constructive and sets the H matrix appropriately to achieve the bounds on
PoA. The H matrix constructed this way acts as the reward sharing scheme to achieve a reasonable
enough social output. For details, see Appendix B. 
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Figure 4: Bounds on PoA for FLAT, d = 6, D = 1.
As opposed to our choice of lower bound φ,
a na¨ıve lower bound of 1β (1 + ln(dβ)) can also
be used. However, this gives a weaker bound
on the PoA. As an example, we demonstrate the
weakness of the bound for FLAT (recall Figure 3)
in Figure 4 (the FLAT hierarchy is a balanced
tree with D = 1, d = n− 1) – where qD is same
as tD when φ(d, β) is defined to be
1
β (1+ln(dβ)).
Figure 4 shows that the bound given by our
analysis is tight for FLAT, indicating the value
of the analysis and also gives intuition to the
shape of the effect of β on the PoA.
We can then have the following corollaries
of Theorem 4,
Corollary 2 (Optimal Effort) For the
FLAT hierarchy, if 0 6 β < − ln (1− 1n), the
optimal effort profile is where all nodes put unit effort. When − ln (1− 1n) 6 β < ∞, the optimal
changes to the profile where the root node puts zero effort and each other node puts unit effort.
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Corollary 3 For the FLAT hierarchy, when 0 6 β 6 1, PoA = 1, and when 1 < β < ∞, PoA
6 nφ(d,β) .
The second corollary above makes rigorous the intuition that when β is small enough the optimal
x can be achieved in the equilibrium of a strategic play of the agents by choosing a small enough
reward share h. However, when β grows, in order to ensure uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium,
the choice of h becomes limited (as it has to satisfy 6 (1 + b)/β2) resulting in a PoA, as captured
in Figure 4.
Theorem 4 also gives a theoretical justification of the usefulness of good communication on
productive output in balanced hierarchies. When communication is good, i.e., β is small, it is
possible to design reward sharing schemes to achieve optimal effort profile in equilibrium – which
ceases to be the case when communication worsens (β becomes large).
4 A General Network Model of Influencer and Influencee
In this section, we show that the results on existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium generalize to a much broader setting of agents as influencer and influencees interacting
over an arbitrary network.
Suppose that the agents are connected over a (possibly non-hierarchical) network G. Each
node i has a set of influencers, denoted by Ri (generalizing Pθ→i), and a set of influencees, Ei
(generalizing Ti \ {i}). We import the notation from Section 2 with their exact or analogous
meanings for productivity pi(xRi) and reward sharing scheme H. Now, the payoff function of agent
i is given by,
ui(xi, x−i) = pi(xRi)f(xi) +
∑
j∈Ei
hijpj(xRj )xj . (12)
We assume that f is a strictly concave function, and is continuously differentiable. We will
refer to the product of effort xi and productivity pi(xRi) as the output, and denote it by yi. In this
context, we do not impose any condition on the nature of the productivity function pi(·), and as
before, this game is also not necessarily a concave game and the existence of a Nash equilibrium is
not always guaranteed.
4.1 Results
The payoff function given by Equation (12) induces a game between the influencers and the influ-
encees. In addition, as before, every agent faces a trade-off when deciding how much production
and communication effort to exert. We will use the following facts which are well known from real
analysis (Rudin, 1964).
Fact 1 If a function is continuously differentiable and strictly concave, its derivative is continuous
and monotone decreasing.
Fact 2 A continuous and monotone decreasing function is invertible and the inverse is also con-
tinuous and monotone decreasing.
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Using the above two facts, we see that the inverse of f ′ exists and is monotone decreasing. Let
us denote f ′−1 by `. Let us define two functions g and T similar to that defined in Section 2.
gi(x) =
∑
j∈Ei
hij
(
− 1
pi(xRi)
∂pj(xRj )
∂xi
xj
)∣∣∣∣
x
, (13)
T (x) = min{max{0, x}, 1}. (14)
Fact 3 The function T is continuous.
Lemma 3 (Necessary condition for Nash equilibrium) If a Nash equilibrium exists for the
effort game in a influencer-influencee network, the effort profile (x∗i , x
∗
−i) must satisfy,
x∗i = T ◦ ` ◦ gi(x∗), ∀i ∈ N. (15)
To illustrate what this necessary condition means, let us assume, for simplicity, that we do not
hit the edges of the truncation function T . Therefore we can rewrite Equation (15) as,
f ′(x∗i ) =
∑
j∈Ei
hij
(
− 1
pi
∂pj
∂xi
xj
)∣∣∣∣
x∗
=
∑
j∈Ei
hij
(
− 1
pi
∂yj
∂xi
)∣∣∣∣
x∗
(16)
Where yj = pjxj is the output of node j. We have dropped the arguments of pi and pj for brevity
of notation. The expression on the LHS is the rate of change of direct benefit for agent i. The RHS
is the rate at which the passive output of agent i changes w.r.t. his effort xi and productivity pi. If
the LHS is larger, the agent would gain more at the margin by increasing xi. This is because the
derivative (−∂yj/∂xi) is non-negative since ∂pj/∂xi is always non-positive. Similarly, if the RHS
was larger, the agent could gain at the margin by decreasing xi. Hence Equation (16) resembles a
rate balance equation (or demand-supply curve) where the rate of effective direct payoff matches
the rate of passive payoffs.
Figure 5: Impact on the production effort of a
node having higher EFOR from the influencees.
Let us define the effective fractional output
rate (EFOR) at x as
∑
j∈Ei hij
(
− 1pi
∂yj
∂xi
)∣∣∣
x
. In
some settings, e.g., if pi(xRi) =
∏
k∈Ri(1− xk),
the fractional output rate
(
− 1pi
∂yj
∂xi
)
can be in-
dependent of the production effort of i, i.e., xi.
In such settings, Equation (16) shows that if the
EFOR of node i increases, the equilibrium for
node i will move in a direction that decreases
production effort xi. This happens because the
slope of f in equilibrium is always non-negative
and its increase leads to a smaller xi because of
the concavity of f . This phenomenon is graph-
ically shown in Figure 5. This shows that the
nodes having a higher EFOR, which is a func-
tion of the network position of an agent, can leverage more on the production efforts of the influ-
encees.
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Following Definition 1, we define the effort update function (EUF) F : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n for the
general setting as, F (x) = T ◦ ` ◦ g(x), where T ◦ ` operates on the vector function g element-wise.
Therefore, the question of existence of a Nash equilibrium of this effort game is the same as asking
the question if the following fixed point equation has a solution: x = F (x).
In the following, we provide a sufficient condition for existence of the Nash equilibrium, and its
uniqueness.
Lemma 4 For pi > 0, for all i ∈ N , and continuously differentiable, F (x) is continuous.
Proof : Given pi > 0, for all i ∈ N , and is continuously differentiable. Therefore, the function g,
defined in Equation (13), is continuous in x. Using Facts 2 and 3, we see that the functions ` and
T are continuous. Hence, F ≡ T ◦ ` ◦ g is continuous in x. 
Theorem 5 (Sufficient Condition for a Nash Equilibrium) For pi > 0, for all i ∈ N , and
continuously differentiable, the effort game has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Proof : From Lemma 3, we see that the Nash equilibrium of the effort game is same as the fixed
point of the equation, x = F (x). Since F is continuous (Lemma 4), Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
immediately ensures a fixed point of the above equation to exist. Hence, the effort game has at
least one Nash equilibrium. 
Let us use the shorthand G ≡ ` ◦ g. The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for
the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6 (Sufficient Condition for unique Nash Equilibrium) If supx0 |∇G(x0)| < 1,
then the Nash equilibrium effort profile (x∗i , x
∗
−i) is unique and is given by Equation (15).
Proof : The key here is to show that F is a contraction. We follow the steps of Theorem 2 as
follows:
||F (x)− F (y)|| 6 ||G(x)−G(y)|| 6 |∇G(x0)| · ||x− y||.
This is a contraction as supx0 |∇G(x0)| < 1. 
4.1.1 Interpretation of the sufficient condition of the uniqueness
The sufficient condition given by Theorem 6 is a technical one. We now discuss an interesting
geometric interpretation of this condition. By the Taylor expansion of G with first order remainder
term, we get,
G(x)−G(y) = ∇G(x0) · (x− y).
Where x0 lies on the line joining x and y. Using singular value decomposition, we get, ∇G(x0) =
U0Σ0V
>
0 . Therefore, for each pair of points x and y, we can transform the space of efforts with a
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pure rotation as follows.
G(x)−G(y) = U0Σ0V >0 · (x− y),
⇒ U>0 (G(x)−G(y)) = Σ0 · (x¯− y¯), where x¯ = V >0 x, y¯ = V >0 y
⇒ R(x¯)−R(y¯) = Σ0 · (x¯− y¯), where R ≡ U>0 GV0.
Hence, for any pair of points x and y, we can rotate the space so that the effect of the deviation to
x from y can be captured by a weight on each of the coordinates in the rotated space. Here, the
diagonal matrix Σ0 contains the weights along its diagonal.
Theorem 6 says that for any point x0, if the absolute value of all the elements of this diagonal
matrix is smaller than unity, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is guaranteed. Let us denote
the rotated vector of x0 by z0 := V
>
0 x0. The diagonal elements can be written w.r.t. the vectors
in the rotated space as,
(Σ0)ii =
∑
j∈Ei
hij
(
− 1
pi
∂2pj
∂z2i
zj
)∣∣∣∣
z0
=
∂EFOR(z0)
∂zi,0
.
In other words, the diagonal elements are the rate of change of EFOR at z0. Having the rate
of change of EFOR bounded by 1 is a sufficient condition for a unique Nash equilibrium. One
can think of the EFOR as the product of two effects: (1) the rate of change in productivity, which
increases the payoff of the influencees, (2) the reward share hij ’s. The sufficient condition essentially
says that the net effect should not be too large in order to guarantee unique equilibrium.
all rates fall
within the
unit circle
1
∂EFOR(z0)
∂zi,0
Figure 6: Geometric interpretation of the condi-
tion for uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Figure 6 shows a graphical illustration of the
phenomenon in polar co-ordinates, where the
directions represent that of the vectors. The
results say that if for any vector, the singular
values of the Jacobian matrix of G at that point
lies entirely within the unit ball, then there ex-
ists an unique Nash equilibrium. This is similar
to the feedback loop gain of a feedback con-
troller, where the closed loop gain being smaller
than unity ensures stability. We find this nat-
ural parallel between notions of stability (from
control theory) and uniqueness of Nash equilib-
ria interesting.
5 Related Work
The study of effort levels in network games,
where an agent’s utility depends on actions of
neighboring agents has recently received much
attention (Galeotti et al., 2010). For example,
Ballester et al. (2006) show how the level of activity of a given agent depends on the Bonacich
centrality of the agent in the network, for a specific utility structure that results in a concave game.
Our model differs in two aspects: (a) we have multiple types of efforts (namely production and
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communication) which has different nonlinear correlation among the agents, and (b) utilities are
non-concave. In addition, our results give a design recipe for the reward sharing scheme. Rogers
(2008) analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in two specific types of games (i) ‘giving’ and (ii) ‘tak-
ing’, where an edge means utility is sent on an edge. A strategic model of effort is discussed in
the public goods model of Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007), where utility is concave in individual
agents’ efforts, and the structures of the Nash and stable equilibria are shown. Their model applies
to a very specific utility structure where the same benefit of the ‘public good’ is experienced by all
the first level neighbors on a graph. In our model, the individual utilities can be asymmetric, and
depend on the efforts and reward shares in multiple levels on the graph. Building on these efforts
our utility model cleanly separate the effects of two types of influence, that we termed information
and incentives.
The DARPA Red Balloon Challenge, and particularly the hierarchical network and specific
reward structure used by the winning MIT team (Pickard et al., 2011), has led to a renewed
interest in the analysis of effort exerted by agents in networks. The winning team’s strategy,
utilized a recursive incentive mechanism. Our results show that, in this case for example, too much
reward sharing encourages managers to spend more time recruiting or managing and not enough
time searching or working, though we do not study network formation games here.
The literature on strategic social network formation games and organizational design is vast
(Jackson, 2009; Harris and Raviv, 2002). We use the Price of Anarchy (PoA) introduced by Kout-
soupias and Papadimitriou (1999) to measure the sub-optimality in outcome efforts, as a function
of network structure and incentives, due to the self interested nature of agents. In the network
contribution games literature, the PoA has been investigated in different contexts. Anshelevich
and Hoefer (2012) consider a model where an agent’s contribution locally benefit the nodes who
share an edge with him, and give existence and PoA results for pairwise equilibrium for different
contribution functions. The PoA in cooperative network formation is considered by Demaine et al.
(2009), while Roughgarden (2005); Garg and Narahari (2005) have considered the question in a
selfish network routing context. Our setting is different from all of these since in our model the
strategies are the efforts of the agents, which distinguishes it from the network formation and selfish
routing literature, and we use multiple levels of information and reward sharing and study utilities
that are asymmetric even for the neighboring nodes in the network, which distinguishes itself from
the network contribution games.
6 Summary and Future Work
In this paper, we build on the papers by Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007); Ballester et al. (2006)
and develop an understanding of the effort levels in influencer-influencee networks. Taking a game
theoretic perspective, we introduce a general utility model which results in a non-concave game,
but are able to show results on the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium efforts. For the
ease of exposition, we focused on hierarchical networks, and with the EP model we found closed
form expressions and bounds on the PoA for balanced hierarchies. These results give us the insight
on the importance of communication in hierarchies on the design of efficient networks. At the same
time, for a given network structure and communication level, we give a design recipe for the reward
sharing in order to achieve highly productive output, and thereby minimize the PoA.
The connection between matrix stability and uniqueness of Nash equilibria that arose in our
work, is of particular interest to us for future research. In particular, for the general networks there
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was a direct interpretation of the uniqueness condition in terms of a Jacobian matrix stability. This
stability property is directly related to the contraction property that shows that agents following
local updates on effort levels will converge to the Nash equilibrium another desirable property.
Pursuing these connections in the investigation of reward share design where individual employees
behave in a strategic way in organizational networks is an important direction of future research.
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Appendices
A Proofs for the Exponential Productivity Model
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof : The argument for the existence of a Nash equilibrium is straightforward in this particular
setting. We see that because of the hierarchical structure of the network, the leaf nodes will always
put unit effort, i.e., x∗leaves = 1. To compute the equilibrium in the level above the leaves one can
run a backward induction algorithm to maximize 1 at each level, where the equilibrium efforts in the
levels below is already computed by the algorithm. Since, all pi’s are bounded and the maximization
is over xi ∈ [0, 1], a compact space, maxima always exists. Hence, a Nash equilibrium always exists.
Now we show that a Nash equilibrium profile (x∗i , x
∗
−i) must satisfy Equation (4). For nota-
tional convenience, we drop the arguments of pi and pij , which are functions of xPθ→i and xPi−→j
respectively. Each agent i ∈ N solves the following optimization problem.
maxxi ui(xi, x−i)
s.t. xi > 0
(17)
Combining Equations (1), (2), and (3), we get,
ui(xi, x−i) = pi(xPθ→i)
(
xi − x
2
i
2
− b(1− xi)
2
2
)
+
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
hijpj(xPθ→j )xj .
Note that we have relaxed the constraint from 0 6 xi 6 1. The first additive term in the utility
function has the peak at xi = 1. The second term has e
βxi in the pj , which is decreasing in xi.
Therefore, the optimal xi that maximizes this utility will be 6 1. Hence, in this problem setting,
the optimal solution for both the exact and the relaxed problems is the same. So, it is enough
to consider the above problem. For this non-linear optimization problem, we can write down the
Lagrangian as follows.
L = ui(xi, x−i) + λixi, λi > 0.
The KKT conditions for this optimization problem (17) are:
∂L
∂xi
= 0,⇒ ∂
∂xi
ui(xi, x−i) + λi = 0, (18)
λixi = 0, complementary slackness. (19)
Case 1: λi = 0, then from Equation (18) we get,
pi(1− xi + b(1− xi)) +
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
hij
∂pj
∂xi
xj = 0
⇒ pi(1 + b)(1− xi)− β
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
hijpjxj = 0
⇒ 1− xi = β
1 + b
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
hijpijxj , with pij as defined
⇒ xi = 1− β
1 + b
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
hijpijxj . (20)
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Case 2: λi > 0, then from Equation (19) we get xi = 0, and from Equation (18),
∂
∂xi
ui(xi, x−i) < 0.
Carrying out the differentiation as in Equation (20) we get,
0 = xi > 1− β
1 + b
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
hijpijxj . (21)
∴ xi =
1− β
1 + b
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
hijpijxj
+ .
Since this condition has to hold for all nodes i ∈ N , the equilibrium profile (x∗i , x∗−i) must satisfy
the above equality. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We prove this theorem via the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 If β <
√
1+b
hmax(T )
, the function F is a contraction.
Proof : The Taylor series expansion of g with a first order remainder term is as follows. There
exists a point x0 that lies on the line joining x and y, such that,
g(x) = g(y) +∇g(x0) · (x− y).
Where, ∇g(x0) is the Jacobian matrix.
∇g(x0) =

∂g1
∂x1
. . . ∂g1∂xn
...
. . .
∂gn
∂x1
. . . ∂gn∂xn

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x0
In order to show that F is a contraction, we note that F is a truncation of g. Hence, ||F (x)−F (y)|| 6
||g(x)− g(y)||, for all x,y ∈ [0, 1]n. Let us consider the following term,
||F (x)− F (y)|| 6 ||g(x)− g(y)|| 6 |∇g(x0)| · ||x− y|| (22)
Where the matrix norm |∇g(x0)| is the largest singular value of the Jacobian matrix ∇g(x0). We
see that in our special structure in the problem, this matrix is upper triangular, hence the diagonal
elements are the singular values. Suppose, the k-th diagonal element yields the largest singular
value.
|∇g(x0)| = ∂gk
∂xk
∣∣∣∣
x0
=
β2
1 + b
∑
j∈Tk\{k}
hkjpkjxj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x0
⇒ sup
x0
|∇g(x0)| 6 β
2
1 + b
· hmax(T ) < 1, since β2 < 1 + b
hmax(T )
.
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The first inequality above holds due to the fact that pkj ’s and xj ’s are 6 1, and by the definition
of hmax(T ). Hence, from Equation (22), we get that F is a contraction. 
Proof : [of Theorem 2] We know from Theorem 1 that a Nash equilibrium exists. Under the
sufficient condition given by Lemma 5, the fixed point of x = F (x) is unique. Therefore, the Nash
equilibrium is also unique, and is given by Equation (4). 
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof : To compute the equilibrium production effort x∗i , node i needs to compute Equation (4).
This requires to compute the equilibrium efforts for each node in his subtree Ti. Because of the
fact that x∗i depends only on the equilibrium efforts of the subtree below i, we can apply the
backward induction method starting from the leaves towards the root of this sub-hierarchy Ti.
The worst-case complexity of such a backward induction occurs when the sub-hierarchy is a line.
In such a case the complexity would be |Ti|(|Ti| − 1)/2 = O(|Ti|2) — to compute x∗i we need the
equilibrium effort of every node below i in the hierarchy, and each such node needs computation
equal to its distance from the leaf of this line. In order to compute the equilibrium efforts of the
whole network, it is enough to determine the equilibrium effort at the root because this would,
in the process, determine the equilibrium efforts of each node in the hierarchy. The worst-case
complexity of finding the equilibrium effort at the root is O(n2) and therefore the worst-case
complexity of computing the equilibrium efforts of the whole network is also O(n2). 
B Proofs of the price of anarchy results in balanced hierarchies
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4
We prove this theorem via the following lemma, which finds out the optimal effort profile for β
above a threshold.
Lemma 6 (Optimal Efforts) For a balanced d-ary hierarchy with depth D, any optimal effort
profile has xOPTD+1 = 1. When − ln
(
1− 1d
)
6 β < ∞, the optimal effort profile is xOPTi = 0, ∀i =
1, . . . , D, and xOPTD+1 = 1.
Proof : The social outcome for a given effort vector x on the balanced hierarchy is as follows.
Since, the hierarchy is understood here, we use SO(x) instead of SO(x, BALANCED).
SO(x) = x1 + de
−βx1x2 + d2e−β(x1+x2)x3 + · · ·+ dDe−β(
∑D
i=1 xi)xD+1.
It is clear that for any effort profile of the other nodes the effort at the leaves that maximizes the
above expression is xD+1 = 1. This proves the first part of the lemma. Hence we can simplify the
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above expression by,
SO(x) = x1 + de
−βx1x2 + d2e−β(x1+x2)x3 + · · ·+ dDe−β(
∑D
i=1 xi)
= x1 + de
−βx1x2 + · · ·+ dD−1e−β(
∑D−1
i=1 xi)(xD + de
−βxD) (23)
6 x1 + de−βx1x2 + · · ·+ dD−1e−β(
∑D−1
i=1 xi) · d.
The last inequality occurs since β > − ln (1− 1d), and xD = 0 meets this inequality with a equality.
Also since β > − ln (1− 1d) implies that β > − ln (1− 1dk ), for all k > 2, the next inequality will
also be met by xD−1 = 0 as shown below.
SO(x) = x1 + de
−βx1x2 + · · ·+ dD−1e−β(
∑D−1
i=1 xi) · d
= x1 + de
−βx1x2 + · · ·+ dD−2e−β(
∑D−2
i=1 xi)(xD−1 + d2e−βxD−1)
6 x1 + de−βx1x2 + · · ·+ dD−2e−β(
∑D−2
i=1 xi) · d2.
This inequality is also achieved by xD−1 = 0. We can keep on reducing the terms from the right in
the RHS of the above equation, and in all the reduced forms, xi = 0, i = D − 1, D − 2, . . . , 1 will
maximize the social output expression. Hence proved. 
Proof : [of Theorem 4] Case 1 (0 6 β 6 1): From Lemma 6, xD+1 = 1 for optimal effort. However,
for any equilibrium effort profile xD+1 = 1 as well. Therefore we consider the equilibrium effort of
the nodes at level D.
xD = 1− β
1 + b
de−βxDhD,D+1. (24)
The constraint for unique equilibrium demands that dhD,D+1 6 (1 + b)/β2, which makes
β
1+bdhD,D+1 6 1/β, while 1/β > 1. So, we have the liberty of choosing the right hD,D+1 to
achieve any xD ∈ [0, 1], and in particular, the xOPTD . We apply backward induction on the next
level above.
xD−1 = 1− β
1 + b
[de−βxD−1xDhD−1,D + d2e−β(xD−1+xD)hD−1,D+1].
The constraints are dhD−1,D + d2hD−1,D+1 6 (1 + b)/β2. We claim that any xD−1 ∈ [0, 1] is
achievable here as well. To show that, put hD−1,D = 0. The above equation becomes then,
xD−1 = 1− β
1 + b
d2e−β(xD−1+xD)hD−1,D+1
= 1− β
1 + b
d2e−βxD−1
1 + b
dβhD,D+1
hD−1,D+1, from the earlier expression
= 1− dhD−1,D+1
hD,D+1
e−βxD−1
This again can satisfy any xD−1, since the coefficient of the exponential term can be made anywhere
between 0 and 1. It can be made 0 by choosing hD−1,D+1 = 0, and 1 by choosing
dhD−1,D+1
hD,D+1
= 1
which is feasible, since d2hD−1,D+1 = dhD,D+1 6 (1 + b)/β2.
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In the similar way we can continue the induction till the root and can make x∗ = xOPT. Hence,
PoA = 1.
Case 2 (1 < β < ∞): We note that this region of β falls in the region specified by Lemma 6.
Hence the optimal effort is 1 for all the leaves and 0 for everyone else. Hence, the optimal social
output is given by dD. The equilibrium effort for the leaves, xD+1 = 1. However, Equation (24)
may not be satisfiable for any xD since 1/β < 1. In order to push the solution as close to zero as
possible, we choose hD,D+1 = (1 + b)/β
2, and plug it in Equation (24), and the solution is given
by ξ(β) (recall Equation (9)) and the solution set is singleton under this condition. The social
output is dD, which is the numerator of the PoA expression. The denominator is given by the
social output at the Nash equilibrium, which we will try to lower bound. From Equation (23), for
the equilibrium, we know that xD = ξ(β). Therefore,
xD + de
−βxD = xD + dβ(1− xD) = dβ + (1− dβ)ξ(β).
At the same time, we see that the leftmost expression is convex in xD, which can be lower bounded
by the minima, given by,
xD + de
−βxD > 1
β
(1 + ln(dβ)).
Combining the two, a tight lower bound of the expression would be,
xD + de
−βxD > max
{
1
β
(1 + ln(dβ)), dβ + (1− dβ)ξ(β)
}
= φ(d, β).
Plugging this lower bound in Equation (23), we see that,
SO(x)
> x1 + de−βx1x2 + · · ·+ dD−1e−β(
∑D−1
i=1 xi) · φ(d, β)
= x1 + de
−βx1x2 + · · ·+ dD−2e−β(
∑D−2
i=1 xi) · (xD−1 + dφ(d, β)e−βxD−1)
Let us consider the last term within parenthesis.
xD−1 + dφ(d, β)e−βxD−1
= xD−1 + dφ(d, β)
β
ξ(β)
(1− xD−1)
> xD−1 + dφ(d, β)β(1− xD−1), as ξ(β) 6 1
= dφ(d, β)β + (1− dφ(d, β)β)xD−1
> dφ(d, β)β + (1− dφ(d, β)β)ξ(β)
The first equality comes since we can make the equilibrium xD−1 s.t., xD−1 = 1− ξ(β)β e−βxD−1 , by
choosing dhD−1,D = (1 + b)/β2, d2hD−1,D+1 = 0. Also, since ξ(β) 6 1, we conclude, xD−1 > xD =
ξ(β), which gives the second inequality above. On the other hand, using the fact that the expression
xD−1 + dφ(d, β)e−βxD−1 is convex in xD−1, it can be lower bounded by, 1β (1 + ln(dφ(d, β)β)).
Combining this and the above inequality, we get the following.
SO(x) > x1 + de−βx1x2 + · · ·+ dD−2e−β(
∑D−2
i=1 xi) · φ(d · φ(d, β), β)
... repeating the steps above
> tD(d, β), as defined in Equation (10).
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Therefore the PoA 6 dDtD(d,β) . 
C Proofs for general networks
C.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof : We follow the line of proof of Theorem 1. Each agent i ∈ N is solving the following
optimization problem.
maxxi ui(xi, x−i)
s.t. 0 6 xi 6 1
(25)
This is a non-linear optimization problem. Hence we can write down the Lagrangian as follows.
L = ui(xi, x−i) + λixi + γi(1− xi), λi, γi > 0.
The KKT conditions are necessary for this optimization problem (25), which are the following.
∂L
∂xi
= 0,
⇒ ∂
∂xi
ui(xi, x−i) + λi − γi = 0, (26)
λixi = 0, γi(1− xi) = 0. (27)
Case 1: λi = 0, γi = 0, then from Equation (26) we get,
∂
∂xi
ui(xi, x−i) = 0
⇒ pif ′(xi) +
∑
j∈Ei
hij
∂pj
∂xi
xj = 0
⇒ f ′(xi) =
∑
j∈Ei
hij
(
− 1
pi
∂pj
∂xi
xj
)
= gi(x)
⇒ xi = ` ◦ gi(x), from the definition of ` (28)
Case 2: λi > 0, γi = 0, then from Equation (27) we get xi = 0, and from Equation (26),
∂
∂xi
ui(xi, x−i) < 0.
Carrying out the differentiation as in Equation (20), we get,
f ′(xi) < gi(x)⇒ 0 = xi > ` ◦ gi(x), since f is concave
⇒ xi = T ◦ ` ◦ gi(x), where T is the truncation function. (29)
Case 3: λi = 0, γi > 0, then from Equation (27) we get xi = 1, and from Equation (26),
∂
∂xi
ui(xi, x−i) > 0.
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Carrying out similar steps as before, we get,
f ′(xi) > gi(x)⇒ 1 = xi < ` ◦ gi(x)
⇒ xi = T ◦ ` ◦ gi(x), where T is the truncation function. (30)
Case 4: λi > 0, γi > 0, this cannot happen since it will lead to a contradiction 0 = xi = 1.
Therefore, combining Equations (28), (29), and (30), we get,
x∗i = T ◦ ` ◦ gi(x∗), ∀i ∈ N.
Hence proved. 
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